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In safety-critical, networked embedded systems, it is important that the way in 
which a fault(s) in one component of the system can propagate throughout the system to 
other components is analyzed correctly.  Many real-world systems, such as modern 
aircrafts and automobiles, use large-scale networked embedded systems with complex 
behavior.  In this work, we have developed techniques and a software tool, FauPA, that 
uses those techniques to automate fault-propagation analysis of large-scale, networked 
embedded systems such as those used in modern aircraft.  This work makes three main 
contributions. 
1. Fault propagation analyses.  We developed algorithms for two types of 
analyses:  forward analysis and backward analysis.  For backward analysis, we 
developed two techniques:  a naive algorithm and an algorithm that uses Datalog. 
2. A system description language.  We developed a language that we call 
Communication System Markup Language (CSML) based on XML.  A system 
can be specified concisely and at a high-level in CSML. 
3. A GUI-based display of the system and analysis results.  We developed a GUI 
to visualize the system that is specified in CSML.  The GUI also lets the user 










 Embedded systems that contain simple and inexpensive computational units have 
been widely-used for decades.  However, in recent years, embedded systems have 
become dramatically more powerful and complicated.  Large-scale, networked embedded 
systems in many domains (e.g., avionics, automobile, and bio-medical) use computing 
units that have the power of desktop computers, and different components of those 
systems communicate with each other over complex data networks (e.g., AFDX [1,8], 
FlexRay [3], and TTP [6]).  In these systems, environmental data are collected by a large 
number of sensors, and then transmitted to computing units that process them.  After 
processing, the output signals are sent over the data networks to effectors that influence 
physical processes.   Examples of such embedded systems include the Boeing 787 and 
Airbus 380 commercial airplanes and NASA's Crew Exploration Vehicle that use AFDX 
protocol [7], Lockheed Martin's F-16 fighter planes that use TTP protocol [6], and 
BMW's X5 Sports Activity Vehicles that use FlexRay protocol [3]. 
In such systems, it is important to verify that data collection, transmission, and 
processing are performed correctly because such systems are often used in safety-critical 
domains, such as aircraft flight control, medical devices, and nuclear systems.  Failure of 
such systems could result in loss of life, significant property damage, or damage to the 
environment.  A fault in a sensor can cause faulty data to enter the system.  A fault in a 
network device (e.g., a switch or a wire) or an inadequate redundancy measure can cause 
complete loss of data or unexpected delay in data reaching its destination.  A fault in a 
computational unit, at either the hardware or software level, can cause the computation of 




1.1 Fault-Propagation Analysis 
To gain confidence in the correctness of such systems, fault-propagation analysis 
is typically performed.  To perform the analysis, a fault-propagation model is designed so 
that it represents whether a fault in one component or a combination of components can 
cause a critical component of the system to fail.  The analysis then uses the fault-
propagation model to determine whether there are any conditions under which faults in 
one or more components can cause the system to fail. 
Fault-propagation analysis of modern large-scale networked embedded systems is 
more challenging than it was for older systems because these newer systems use shared 
network and computational components.  In the avionics domain, older aircraft were 
designed based on a federated system architecture, in which different operations of the 
aircraft are controlled by different computing units, and computing units communicate 
using point-to-point protocols that do not share the network (e.g., ARINC 429 [5]).  The 
advantage of a federated system is that failure from one computing unit cannot propagate 
to another unit because they are physically separated.  However, such systems are heavy 
and expensive because for each operation there are dedicated resources such as wiring 
and computing units.  In contrast, modern aircrafts are designed based on Integrated 
Modular Architecture (IMA) [9].  In IMA, a single central computing system controls all 
operations of the aircraft, such as avionics, environmental control, electrical, mechanical, 
hydraulic, auxiliary power unit, cabin services, flight controls, health management, fuel, 
payloads, and propulsion.  Different components of an IMA-based system communicate 
using network protocols that share the communication network (e.g., AFDX, FlexRay, or 
TTP).  Because resources (e.g., computing and networking devices) are shared among 
different operations, IMA-based systems are lighter and less expensive.  The 
disadvantage of IMA architecture is that failure in one component of the computing 
system can affect many different operations of the aircraft because the component may be 
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shared.  Thus, a thorough failure analysis of an IMA-based system is necessary.  
One approach to performing failure analysis is to use a standard analysis, such as 
fault-tree analysis (FTA).  FTA analysis requires that domain engineers create a fault-tree 
representation of the embedded system.   In a fault-tree, the root node represents the 
specific undesired state that is being analyzed, and each leaf node represents a failure 
mode in the system.  Each internal node represents an undesired system state that may 
arise as a result of one or more failures.  The children nodes of an internal node represent 
states that aggregately cause the state represented by the internal node.  The aggregation 
function is represented by logical gates, such as AND, OR, and XOR.  
Manually creating a fault-tree representation of a system requires intimate 
understanding of the system.   A fault-propagation model (e.g., fault tree) of a system is 
not specific to any domain, and thus, it requires modeling domain-specific concepts of 
the system at a lower-level of abstraction (e.g., AND and OR gates).  As a result, creating 
a fault-tree representation of a large system can be error-prone and can require a great 
deal of manual effort.  This manual effort can be significantly reduced if the fault-tree 
representation of a system can be automatically generated from a high-level, domain-
specific description of the system. 
1.2 Our Approach 
 To address the limitations of existing techniques, in this research, we have 
developed techniques that reduce the manual effort required to perform fault-propagation 
analysis of large-scale, networked embedded systems.  We have developed two types of 
analyses:  forward analysis and backward analysis.  Forward analysis is used to simulate 
“what if” scenarios.  Given a set of components that could be faulty, forward analysis 
determines whether a fault can propagate to any of the critical components.  Whereas 
forward analysis is targeted towards experts who want to analyze and gain insights into 
the system’s behavior, backward analysis exhaustively and fully-automatically analyzes 
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the system, and computes sets of components such that if all components in any of those 
sets become faulty, the fault can propagate to one or more of the critical components.  
We have also developed an XML-based language, which we call Communication 
System Markup Language (CSML).  CSML can be used to specify networked embedded 
systems that use AFDX data networks.  Unlike the fault-tree representation, in CSML, 
there is no notion of logical gates, such as AND and OR.  Instead, CSML supports 
AFDX-network terminology, such as virtual links, channels, and constructs, to specify 
commonly-used concepts of a networked embedded system, such as sensors, effectors, 
messages, and datasets.  
1.3 FauPA:  A Software System for Fault-Propagation Analysis 
   We implemented our fault-propagation analysis, along with our new XML-based 
language, CSML, in a system that we call FauPA (Fault Propagation Analyzer).  Using 
our new techniques, FauPA reduces the time-consuming manual effort in performing 
fault-propagation analysis by automatically creating the fault-propagation model (which 
is similar to a fault tree) used for the analysis from the system specification.  Using the 
model, FauPA supports various forms of verification on the entire system, such as those 
supported by FTA and FMEA.  FauPA has three major components: 
 Fault Propagation Analyses 
FauPA implements our fault-propagation analysis to check whether faults from a 
specific set of components can propagate to designated critical components (forward 
analysis), and also identifies the set of components from which fault can propagate to 
a designated critical component (backward analysis).  
 Communication System Markup Language (CSML) 
FauPA inputs the description of the system model in a language that we call 
Communication System Markup Language (CSML), an XML based language.  User 
can specify the model in CSML using domain-specific constructs supported by 
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CSML.  FauPA automatically generates a fault-propagation graph from the CSML 
specification of the model.  The fault-propagation graph is used in the subsequent 
analysis stage. 
 GUI-based Display 
FauPA’s GUI displays the systems and the results of the analysis to the user.  
Information, such as the components through which the fault has propagated to the 
critical components, is shown on a graphical representation of the communication 
network.  FauPA’s GUI has features, such as zooming and panning that make the 
visualization of the system more comprehensible. 
1.4 Advantages of Our Approach Over the Fault-Tree Analysis Approach 
There are three important advantages of FauPA over FTA tools.  The first 
advantage of FauPA over FTA tools is that FauPA does not require users to specify the 
fault tree for failure analysis.  Construction of a fault tree requires users to have deep 
knowledge of the system.  In particular, specifying the logical gates requires knowledge 
of how failure modes or undesired system states can give rise to other states.  
Additionally, it is cumbersome to create the fault tree for a system that has a large number 
of failure modes and states.  Because FauPA is specifically designed to analyze a 
computing system that uses an AFDX data network, dependencies between failure modes 
and system states are automatically inferred and a corresponding fault tree is constructed 
from a specification of the physical system. This specification is easier to write than a 
specification of a fault tree, which does not resemble the physical form of the system. 
The second advantage of FauPA over FTA tools is that it is more efficient than 
those tools.  In failure analysis of computing systems, FTA can be used to check whether 
a specific critical component of the system can fail as a result of failure of other 
components.  When the number of critical components is large and the goal is to check 
whether any of the critical components can fail, FTA must be repeated for each critical 
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component.  In contrast, FauPA can check whether any of the critical components fail in 
one execution, which is more efficient than multiple FTA runs. 
    The third advantage of FauPA is that it is more readily applicable to IMA-based 
systems than FTA tools.   Sharing of components in an IMA-based system leads to a 
graph topology of the system. A component that is shared by and receives data from 
multiple components is represented by a node that has multiple incoming edges in the 
fault-propagation graph.  Because FTA analysis is performed over a fault tree, to analyze 
an IMA-based system, users need to convert the fault-propagation graph into a tree by 
duplicating nodes of the graph.  In contrast, FauPA automatically creates the fault-
propagation graph from the system description.  
 
1.5 Overview of the Thesis 
 The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents background 
information about the architecture of computing systems used in modern aircraft.  
Chapter 3 describes the fault-propagation analyses by providing details of the forward 
and backward fault-propagation analyses. Two alternative implementations of backward 
analysis are described:  one alternative uses Datalog [11,13] and the other does not.  
Chapter 4 describes the Communication System Markup Language (CSML), an XML 
based language for specifying an AFDX-based communication system.  This chapter also 
contains the complete CSML specification of a small system.  Chapter 5 describes the 
different features of FauPA’s GUI-based display of the system and analysis results.  









COMPUTING SYSTEMS OF MODERN AIRCRAFTS 
 
 Although our overall goal is to develop techniques that automate fault-
propagation analyses for large-scale, networked embedded systems, for this research we 
concentrate on systems that are similar to the core computing system (CCS) used in 
Boeing's 787 series aircrafts. The target system consists of four types of elements. 
1. Sensors and effectors lie at the boundary of the system. Sensors are devices that 
take readings of environmental parameters, such as temperature and pressure, and 
effectors are devices that typically control a device by sending an output signal. 
2. Remote Data Concentrators (RDC) consolidates inputs from sensors and delivers 
output signals to effectors. 
3. The computing units that host processing and power control modules and network 
switches lie at the heart of computing system.  The processing units receive data 
from RDCs, process them and when necessary, send output signal to RDCs. 
4. An Avionics Full Duplex Switched Ethernet (AFDX) [1] based data network data 
network that transfers data between the computing units and RDCs. 
The RDCs reduce the amount of wiring.  Instead of each function being linked 
(often by long wires) directly to the CCS, a group of functions is connected by short 
wires to the local RDC, which, in turn, is linked to the CCS using an AFDX cable. The 
use of RDCs is similar to the use of USB-based devices on a personal computer, but now 
they are distributed.  
AFDX, which is also known as the ARINC 664 (Part 7) standard, is a 
specification developed by ARINC Corporation for data networks used in aeronautical, 
railway, and military systems.  The AFDX [1] specification is based on standard IEEE 
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802.3 Ethernet technology. AFDX extends the Ethernet standard by adding quality of 
service and deterministic behavior with a guaranteed dedicated bandwidth.  In addition to 
Boeing 787 Dreamliner series of aircrafts, AFDX is currently used in the Airbus A380 
and A400M. 
There are two main advantages of AFDX over standard network technologies:   
(1) reliable packet transport and (2) bounded transport latency.  These are the base 
requirements for a network for avionics applications. Standard Ethernet technology uses a 
topology in which each node in the network is treated equally.  If a peer wants to transmit 
a packet on the network and the media is occupied, a collision occurs, the peer backs up 
and tries again, until the transmission is successful or a predefined amount of time has 
elapsed.  This behavior introduces variable-length latency, which is not tolerable in 
safety-critical applications.  However, these collisions can be avoided in an AFDX 
network because of its switched full-duplex topology. 
To increase the availability of the network, AFDX is built using redundancy on 
the physical layer.  Each data packet is transmitted simultaneously by two Ethernet 
controllers onto separate wires, using physically separate switches, to the destination 
system.  The two redundant physical paths together form a logical connection called 
Virtual Link (VL).  Because of the use of the VL, the network provides   two properties 
that are important for interconnecting avionic systems with different levels of criticality: 
(1) a unidirectional private line with bounded latency and (2) guaranteed bandwidth.  A 
single VL may have point-to-point or point-to-multi-point connections. The advantages 
of AFDX arise because it is compatible at the application level and saves a large number 
of cable runs by multiplexing many individual VLs onto a single wire connection.  
Because the IEEE 802.3 standard allows multicast packet transmission on the Ethernet, it 





FAULT PROPAGATION ANALYSES 
 
In this chapter, we describe the forward and backward fault-propagation analyses, 
along with two alternative implementations of backward analysis:  one alternative uses 
Datalog and the other does not. 
 
3.1   Fault-Propagation Model 
In FauPA, a fault-propagation model is automatically extracted from a high-level 
description of the system. The fault-propagation model is a directed graph that represents 
the way in which faults propagate through the system.  A node in the graph corresponds 
to either one physical entity (e.g., sensor, RDC, value of a physical parameter, wire, or 
bus) of the model or a group of physical entities (e.g., channel or virtual link).  We refer 
to the second type of nodes as auxiliary nodes.  Each node has a binary fault status, 
which can be TRUE or FALSE:  TRUE fault status of a node means that the node is 
faulty; FALSE fault status means that the node is not faulty.  
If the fault status for a node corresponding to a physical entity is TRUE, a fault 
has been introduced in that entity. The fault status of an auxiliary node in the graph 
represents the collective fault statuses of the corresponding group of physical entities.   
For example, the fault status of an auxiliary node corresponding to a channel, which 
consists of switches and wires, represents whether those switches and wires can correctly 
transmit some data.  If the fault status of such a node corresponding to a channel is 
TRUE, at least one of the switches or wires that belong to the channel is faulty.  If the 
fault status is FALSE, none of the switches and wires is faulty.  Furthermore, if the fault 
status of an auxiliary node is TRUE, the fault has propagated to this node from a node 
that corresponds to a physical entity. 
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An edge from node X to an auxiliary node Y means that the fault may propagate 
from X to Y, depending on Y’s transfer function, which determines how Y’s fault status is 
affected by X’s fault status.  An auxiliary node can have one of two types of transfer 
functions:  OR transformation function or AND transformation function.  The fault status 
of an auxiliary node that has an OR transfer function becomes TRUE if the fault status of 
any of its predecessors is TRUE, whereas, the fault status of an auxiliary node that has 
OR transfer function becomes TRUE if the fault statuses of all of its predecessors are 
TRUE.  The nodes with the AND transfer function arise because of the system’s 
redundancy measures.  For example, a virtual link that has two redundant channels will 
become faulty only if both of its channels become faulty.  Thus, a virtual link is 
represented by an auxiliary node with the OR transfer function. 
Based on the criticality of the components in the model, the nodes in the graph are 
categorized as critical and non-critical nodes.  Critical nodes are those that should never 
become faulty because the result would be catastrophic.  In contrast,   non-critical nodes 
can become faulty because they would not cause a catastrophic failure.  The goal of the 
fault-propagation analysis is to exhaustively analyze whether faults from non-critical 
nodes can propagate and eventually make any of the critical nodes faulty. 
3.2  Example of Fault-Propagation Graph 
Figure 3.1 shows an example system.  In Figure 3.1, VL1 is not a physical entity 
in the model but consists of two physical paths:   PathA and PathB.    Each path consists of 
different switches and wires to connect them. PathA is  (a1, wire1, a2) and PathB is ( b1, 

















Figure 3.1:  An example system. 
                     
 
                              
Figure 3.2:  Fault- propagation graph corresponding to Figure 3.1. 
 
For the system shown in Figure 3.1, our technique builds a graph as shown in 
Figure 3.2.  In Figure 3.1, a1, a2, b1, b2, c, and reading1 are the physical entities of the 
system.  Each of them is represented as nodes in our graph, which are represented as 
circles or ovals in Figure 3.2.  VL1, PathA and PathB are represented by auxiliary nodes in 






















status of Reading1 that is being transmitted over VL1.  Thus, Signal_out1 will be correct if 
both Reading1 and VL1 are correct.  In other words, the fault status of Signal_out1 will be 
TRUE if the fault status of either Reading1 or VL1 is TRUE.  Hence, Signal_out1 is an 
auxiliary node in our graph with transformation function OR. The correctness of VL1 
depends on the correctness of either PathA or PathB.  VL1 represents two redundant paths 
here:  the fault status of VL1 will be TRUE if fault status of both PathA and PathB is 
TRUE.  Hence, VL1 is an auxiliary node in our graph with transformation function AND.  
Correctness of both PathA and PathB are dependent on the correctness of all of their 
components.  Hence, both PathA and PathB are auxiliary nodes in our graph with 
transformation function OR. 
 
3.3  Fault-Propagation Analysis 
          We have developed two types of analyses:  forward analysis and backward 
analysis.  Given a set of components that could be faulty and set of critical nodes, 
forward analysis computes the (possibly empty) subset of critical nodes to which that a 
fault or faults can propagate.  Given a set of critical nodes, backward analysis computes 
sets of components such that if all components in any one of those sets become faulty, 
fault can propagate to one or more of the critical components.  
 
3.3.1  Forward Fault-Propagation Analysis 
        The input to the forward analysis is a set of components that could be faulty and a 
set of critical nodes.  The goal of the forward analysis is to compute the (possibly empty) 
subset of critical nodes to which a fault or faults can propagate.  This analysis is 
performed using Algorithm 3.1. 
Input: faultyNodes:  set of nodes representing physical entities in which faults  
                                have been introduced 
           criticalNodes: set of critical nodes that should not become faulty 
Output: faultyCritical:  set (possibly empty) that contains critical 
                                    nodes that become faulty because of fault propagation 
Declare:  workList:  a list of nodes 
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                visited:  a set of nodes 
 
1 method forward(faultyNodes, criticalNodes) 
2     set the fault status of each node in the set faultyNodes to TRUE 
3     workList  empty_list() 
4     add each node in the faultyNodes set to workList 
5     visited  empty_set() 
6     while workList is not empty do 
7          n  remove a node from workList 
8          if n (element) visited then continue 
9          add n to visited          
11        if n has no transfer function then  
12           add all successors of n to workList 
13           continue 
14        endif 
15        if transfer function of n is OR then 
16             st = logical OR of fault statuses of all predecessors of n 
17       else if transfer function of n is AND then 
18             st = logical AND of fault statuses of all predecessors of n 
19       endif 
20       set st as the fault status of n 
21       if st is TRUE then 
22            if n is in criticalNodes then 
23             add n to faultyCritical  
24           endif 
25           add all successors of n to workList 
26       endif 
27  return faultyCritical 
Algorithm 3.1 
           Algorithm 3.1 is a variation of a standard graph-reachability algorithm [12].  The 
inputs to the algorithm are two sets:  faultyNodes and CriticalNodes.  faultyNodes is the 
set of nodes in which faults are introduced.  CriticalNodes is the set of nodes that must 
not become faulty.  The algorithm outputs  faultyCritical, which is a subset of 
CriticalNodes, and contains all critical nodes to which a fault or faults can propagate.  
The algorithm maintains two data-structures:  workList and visited.  workList is a list  of 
nodes that must be processed, and visited is a set that stores all nodes that have been 
processed.  The algorithm traverses the graph starting from each node in faultyNodes.    
In line 2, the fault status of each node in faultyNodes is set to TRUE.  In lines 3-4, 
workList is initialized to contain each node in the faultyNodes.  While the workList is not 
empty, the while loop starting at line 6 removes a node from workList (line 7) and 
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processes the node.  The algorithm ensures that each node is processed only once (lines 
8-9).  Thus, it eventually terminates for any input graph. 
          When a node that has a transfer function is processed, its fault status is computed 
from the fault statuses of its predecessors based on the node’s transformation function.  In 
lines 15-16, the fault status of a node with an OR transformation function is computed.  
The fault status of such a node is the result of the logical OR operation of the fault 
statuses of all of its predecessors.  Similarly, the fault status of a node with an AND 
transformation function is computed in lines 17-18. The fault status of such a node is the 
result of the logical AND operation of the fault statuses of all of its predecessors.  When a 
node that does not have a transfer function is processed, the only operation that is 
performed is to add the node’s successor nodes to workList. 
          If the fault status of a node evaluates to TRUE, all of its successor nodes are put 
into workList for processing (line 25) because the fault statuses of those successor nodes 
may now evaluate to TRUE.  Also, when the fault status of a critical node evaluates to 
TRUE, the node is added to the result set faultyCritical. 
          Algorithm 3.1 processes each node only once.  Thus, the while loop at line 6 
iterates n times.  In each iteration, the algorithm performs constant work.  Thus, the 
complexity of Algorithm 3.1 is O(n), where n is the number of nodes in the graph. 
          We illustrate Algorithm 3.1 using the fault-propagation graph shown in Figure 3.2. 
Suppose a fault is introduced in components that correspond to nodes a1 and a2.  Thus, 
faultyNodes contains these two nodes, and their fault statuses will be set to TRUE at the 
beginning of the algorithm.  Suppose Signal_out1 is the only critical node, and thus,   
crtiticalNodes contain only Signal_out1.  Suppose further that the algorithm first 
processes node a1 and then node a2.  Because those nodes have no transfer function, the 
algorithm simply adds their successor PathA to workList.  When the PathA is processed, 
because it has an OR transformation function, its fault status is evaluated by taking the 
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logical OR of the fault statuses of its predecessors:  wire1, a1, a2, and c.  Because the fault 
statuses of a1 and a2 are TRUE, the fault of status of PathA is set to TRUE.  Now the 
successor of PathA, which is VL1, is added to workList.  When VL1 is processed, its fault 
status is computed by taking the logical AND of the fault statuses of its predecessors:  
PathA and PathB.  Although the fault status of PathA is TRUE, the fault status of VL1 
evaluates to FALSE because the fault status of PathB (the other predecessor of PathA) is 
FALSE.  Because VL1’s fault status evaluates to FALSE, its successors are not added to 
workList.  At this point, the algorithm terminates and returns faultyCritical because 
workList is empty.  In this example, the algorithm returns the empty set faultyCritical as 
the result, which means that the fault from nodes a1 and a2 did not propagate to any 
critical node. 
 
3.3.2  Backward Analysis 
           Given a set of critical nodes, the goal of the backward analysis is to compute the 
set S of pairs and triples of nodes such that (1) a pair (m, n) is in S if a fault can propagate 
to one of the critical nodes when faults are introduced in both nodes m and n, and (2) a 
triple (m, n, p) is in S if a fault can propagate to one of the critical nodes when faults are 
introduced in nodes m, n, and p.  We designed two algorithms to perform backward 
analysis:  a naive algorithm and an algorithm that uses Datalog. 
 
3.3.2.1 Naive Backward Analysis 
        The naive backward-analysis algorithm is shown in Algorithm 3.2. The input to the 
algorithm is CirticalNodes, which is the set of nodes that must not become faulty. The 
output of the algorithm is the set S, which is described in the previous paragraph.  In line 
2, S is initialized to empty set.  In lines 3-7, for each pair of nodes (A,B) in the graph, the 
algorithm calls the method forward, which is defined in Algorithm 3.1, to check whether 
any of the critical nodes can become faulty as a result of introducing faults in nodes A 
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and B.  If one or more critical node can become faulty, then the algorithm adds the pair 
(A,B) to the result set S. The algorithm processes every node triple in similar manner in 
lines 9-13.  In line 15, the algorithm returns S. 
 
Input: criticalNodes: set of critical nodes that should not become faulty 
Output: S: a set of pairs and triples of nodes such that (1) A pair (m, n) is in S if fault             
                 can propagate to one of the critical nodes when faults are introduced in both   
                 nodes m and n, and (2) a triples (m, n, p) is in S if fault can propagate to one  
                 of the critical nodes when faults are introduced in nodes m, n, and p.  
 
1  method backward(criticalNodes) 
2    S empty_set() 
3    foreach pair of nodes (A,B) do 
4       result  forward({A, B}, criticalNodes) ) 
5       if result is not empty then 
6            add (A,B) to S)  
7       endif 
8    done 
9    foreach triples of nodes (A,B,C) do 
10     result  forward({A, B, C}, criticalNodes) ) 
11     if result is not empty then 
12          add (A,B,C) to S 
13     endif 
14   done 
15   return S 
Algorithm 3.2. Naive Backward Propagation Algorithm 
           If n is the number of nodes in the graph, then there are (n * (n-1))/2   node pairs, 
and (n * (n-1) * (n-2))/6   node triples.  Thus, Algorithm 3.2 calls method forward (shown 
in Algorithm 3.1) ((n+1) * n * (n-1))/6   times because   forward   is called once for each 
node pair and each node triple. Because the complexity of each call to forward is O(n), 




3.3.2.2 Datalog-Based Backward Analysis 
           Datalog [11, 13] is a query and rule language for deductive databases that 
syntactically is a subset of Prolog. A deductive database is a database that can deduce 
(i.e., conclude additional facts) based on rules and facts stored in the (deductive) 
database.  A Datalog program consists of a set of clauses.  A clause is a head literal 
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followed by an optional body.   A body is a comma separated list of literals.  A clause 
without a body is called a fact, and a clause with a body is called a rule.  The punctuation 
‘:-’ separates the head of a rule from its body.  Intuitively, a clause means that the head of 
a clause holds if each of the literals in the body holds.  For example, consider two 
relations:   parent(P, X), and sibling(X, Y).  Suppose parent(P, X) holds for P and X if P is 
a parent of X, and sibling(X, Y) holds for X and Y if X is a sibling of Y.  Then, the 
following clause means that if P is a parent of X and P is a parent of Y, then X and Y are 
siblings. 
sibling(X, Y) :- parent(P, X), parent(P, Y) 
           To perform backward analysis using Datalog, we represent the fault-propagation 
graph, information about which nodes are critical nodes, and fault-propagation rules in a 
Datalog program. The Datalog program is then evaluated by a Datalog engine. The result 
of evaluating the Datalog program is the set S of desired pairs and triples (as defined 
above). 
           In FauPA, we use the bddbddb Datalog engine [10].  The feature of bdddbbd that 
distinguishes it from other Datalog engines is that bddbddb internally uses binary 
decision diagrams (BDDs) to evaluate a Datalog program.  BDDs are a data structure that 
can efficiently represent large relations and provide efficient set operations.  Thus, BDDs 
let bddbddb efficiently represent and operate on extremely large relations—relations that 
are too large to represent explicitly. 
           We create the Datalog program as follows.   In the fault-propagation graph, if there 
is an edge from node X to node Y, then we generate the following fact: 
edge(X, Y). 
For each node X that represents a physical entity (e.g., LRU, switch, wire), we generate 




For each auxiliary node Y that has OR transfer function, we generate the following the 
following fact: 
auxnode(Y, OR).       
Similarly, for each auxiliary node Y that has an AND transfer function, we generate the 
following : 
auxnode(Y, AND).       
          To encode fault-propagation rules, we use three relations:  singleton, pair, and 
triple.  The singleton relation singleton(P,A) means that if a fault is introduced in 
node A, then the fault can propagate to node P. 
singleton(P,A) :- A = P, leaf(A).                           (1) 
singleton(P,A) :- auxnode(P,OR),edge(Q,P),singleton(Q,A).   (2) 
singleton(P,A) :- auxnode(P,AND), edge(Q,P),edge(R,P),       
                  singleton(R,A),singleton(Q,A),R!=Q.       (3) 
 
Rule 1 above is trivial:  if A is the same node as P and the fault can be introduced in A, 
then the fault can propagate to P.  Rule 2 and Rule 3 encode how a fault can propagate to 
auxiliary nodes with OR and AND transformation functions, respectively.  Rule 2 means 
that, when a fault is introduced in node A,   the fault can propagate to auxiliary node P, 
which has an OR transformation function, if fault can propagate to Q  and Q is a 
predecessor of P.  Rule 3 means that when a fault is introduced in node A, the fault can 
propagate to auxiliary node P that has an AND transformation function if the fault can 
propagate from A to both of P’s predecessors Q and R. We assume that in the underlying 
fault propagation, every node has exactly two predecessors. 
            The relation pair(P,A,B) means that if a fault is introduced in two nodes,  A 
and B, then the fault can propagate to node P. 
 
pair(P,A,B) :- auxnode(P,OR),edge(Q,P),pair(Q,A,B).          (1) 
pair(P,A,B) :- auxnode(P,AND),edge(Q,P),edge(R,P),  
               singleton(Q,A),singleton(R,B),R!=Q,A!=B.      (2) 
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pair(P,A,B) :- auxnode(P,AND),edge(Q,P),edge(R,P), 
               pair(Q,A,B),singleton(R,A),R!=Q,A!=B.         (3) 
pair(P,A,B) :- auxnode(P,AND),edge(Q,P),edge(R,P), 
               pair(Q,A,B),singleton(R,B),R!=Q,A!=B.         (4) 
pair(P,A,B) :- auxnode(P,AND),edge(Q,P),edge(R,P), 
               pair(Q,A,B),pair(R,A,B),R!=Q,A!=B.            (5) 
pair(P,A,B) :- !singleton(P,A),!singleton(P,B),A!=B.         (6) 
 
Rule 1 specifies how a fault propagates to an auxiliary node with an OR transformation 
function.  Rules 2-5 specify how a fault propagates to an auxiliary node with an AND 
transformation function.  Table 3.1 shows the interpretation of these rules. In the table, Q 
and R are the predecessors of node P.  Rule 6 filters out the elements that are also in the 
singleton relation. 
Table 3.1:  Interpretations of rules used to define the relation Pair(P,A,B) 
Rule P is faulty because: 
1 Q is faulty because of faults introduced at both A and B 
2 Q is faulty because of fault introduced only at A, and R 
is faulty because of fault introduced only at B 
3 Q is faulty because of faults introduced at both A and 
B, and R is faulty because of fault introduced only at A 
4 Q is faulty because of faults introduced at both A and 
B, and R is faulty because of fault introduced only at B 
5 Q is faulty because of faults introduced at both A and 
B, and Q is faulty because faults introduced at both A 
and B 
 
The relation triple(P,A,B,C) is defined similar to Pair(P,A,B).  
 
3.3.2.3 Empirical Comparison of Datalog-Based and Naive Backward Analysis 
           We performed an empirical study to compare the efficiency of our naive 
backward-analysis algorithm and the Datalog-based algorithm.   In one of our largest 
models, we identified seven nodes as critical.  For each of those nodes, we (1) ran 
implementations of the two algorithms to compute the sets of all pairs and triples of 
nodes from which a fault can propagate to the specific critical node, and (2) measured the 
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time taken by each algorithm.  
           Figure 3.3 shows the collected data. The horizontal axis gives the   names of the 
seven critical nodes. The vertical axis shows the times taken by each of the two 
algorithms for each critical node.  For example, in case of when LRU_0509_OUT4 is set 
as the critical node, then the naive algorithm takes about 100 seconds, and the Datalog-
based algorithm takes about 10 seconds.  Figure 3.3 shows that the Datalog-based 
algorithm is at least an order of magnitude faster than the naive algorithm. 
 
 




COMMUNICATION SYSTEM MARKUP LANGUAGE (CSML) 
 
 This chapter describes Communication System Markup Language (CSML), an 
XML-based language to specify an AFDX-based communication system. The input to 
FauPA is CSML.   FauPA automatically generates a fault-propagation graph that is used 
for fault-propagation analysis from the CSML specification of the model.  The fault-
propagation graph is used in the subsequent analysis stage. 
 
4.1 CSML Specification 
Table 4.1 shows the grammar for the CSML language in Backus-Naur form 
(BNF) [14].  A BNF specification is a set of derivation rules, written as 
<symbol> ::= __expression__ 
 <symbol> is a nonterminal, and the __expression__ consists of one or more sequences of 
symbols; more sequences are separated by the vertical bar, '|', indicating a choice, the 
whole being a  possible substitution for the symbol on the left. Symbols that never appear 
on a left side are terminals. On the other hand, symbols that appear on a left side are non-
terminals and are always enclosed between the pair <>. 
In a CSML specification, there are two types of root-level elements:  
 <of> element  
 <vl> element 
 
4.1.1 <of> Element 
 For each hosted function of the system, there is an <of> element.  An<of> 
element has a name attribute that stores the name of the function and helps in referring to 
a particular function.  Each <of> elements has two types of elements as its children:  
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<host> element, <input> element, and <dest> element. 
Table  4.1: Grammar of CSML in Backus-Naur Form (BNF). 
<csml>  :=  "<csml>" <vl-list> <of-list> "</csml>"  
 
<vl-list>  :=  <vl> | <vl> <vl-list> 
<vl>  :=  "<vl" "name" "=" TEXT "source" "=" TEXT ">" <channel-list> <msg-list> 
"</vl>" 
 
<channel-list>  :=  <channel> | <channel> <channel-list> 
<channel>  :=  "<channel>" <component-list> "</channel>" 
 
<component-list>  :=  <component> | <component> <component-list> 
<component>  :=  "<component>" TEXT "</component>" 
 
<msg-list>  :=  <msg> | <msg> <msg-list> 
<msg>  :=  "<msg" "name" "=" TEXT ">" <ds-list> "</msg>" 
 
<ds-list>  :=  <ds> | <ds> <ds-list> 
<ds>  :=  "<ds" "name" "=" TEXT ">" "<dest>" TEXT "</dest>" <param-list> "</ds>" 
 
<param-list>  :=  <param> | <param> <param-list> 
<param>  :=  "<param>" TEXT "</param>" 
 
<of-list>  :=  <of> | <of> <of-list> 
<of>  :=  "<of" "name" "=" TEXT ">" <host-list> <input-list> <dest-list> "</of>" 
 
<host-list>  :=  <host> | <host> <host-list> 
<host>  :=  "<host" "name" "=" TEXT ">" <output> "</host>" 
 
<output>  :=  "<output>" TEXT "</output>" 
 
<input-list>  :=  <input> | <input> <input-list> 
<input>  :=  "<input>" <param-list> "</input>" 
 
<dest-list>  :=  <dest> | <dest> <dest-list> 
<dest>  :=  "<dest" "name" "=" TEXT "/>" 
  
4.1.1.1 <host> Element  
            An <of> element has one or more <host> child elements. A <host> element 
has a name attribute, whose value identifies the computer or partition of the computer 
that computes this function.  Each <host> element has an <output> child element. 
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An <output> element specifies the output signal computed by this <host> element 
for this <of> element. 
 
4.1.1.2 <input> Element 
 An <of> element has one or more <input> child elements.  The <input> 
elements are redundant with each other.  An <input> element has one or more 
<param> elements as its children.  The value of <param> elements inside each 
<input> element represents different readings of same environmental parameters.  The 
number of <param> elements inside each <input> element is always same.  A 
<param> child element specifies the input signal to this function <of> element. 
 
4.1.1.3 <dest> Element 
 An <of> element must have one or more <dest> elements as children.  A 
<dest> element represents the destinations or effectors who subscribes for the output 
signal computed by this <of> function.  A <dest> element has a name attribute, 
whose value identifies the name of the effector who requires the computed output signal 
by this <of> function. 
 
4.1.2  <vl> Element 
 For each virtual link of the system there is a <vl> element. Each <vl> element 
has two attributes: name and source.  The value of the name attribute uniquely 
identifies the virtual link.   The value of a source attribute uniquely identifies the 
component that sends messages through this virtual link.  Each <vl> element has two 
types of elements as its children: <channel>, and <msg>. 
 
4.1.2.1 <channel> Element 
  A <vl> element has one or more <channel> elements as children.  Each of 
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these <channel> elements corresponds to a channel of the virtual link.  Each channel 
element has one or more <component> elements as its children.  A <component> 
element uniquely identifies a RDC, switch or wire of the system that is used in the virtual 
link. 
 
4.1.2.2 <msg> Element 
 A <vl> element has one or more <msg> elements as children.  Each of these 
<msg> elements corresponds to a message sent through this virtual link.  Each <msg> 
element has one attribute name whose value uniquely represents the message.  Each 
<msg> element has one or more <ds> elements as its children. 
 
4.1.2.2.1 <ds> Element 
 A <ds> element represents one of the dataset associated with a message <msg> 
element.  Each <ds> element must have one or more <param> element and <dest> 
element.  A <param> element represents a parameter or signal packed in this dataset. 
A <ds> element must have one or more <dest> elements as children.  A <dest> 













4.2 Sample Model with CSML Specification 
In the following, we describe a sample system (shown in Figure 4.1) and then 
present its CSML specification (shown in Table 4.2).  The descriptions of different parts 
of the system refer to the line numbers in the CSML specification where they are 
mentioned. 
 The sample system shown in Figure 4.1, there are two output functions, named 
pr and vel, hosted on the host or computer ACR1.  The output function vel 
computes the velocity (v) of the plane.  The inputs to vel are angle of attack (aoa) and 
speed(u).  ACR1 receives two redundant copies of u: u1 and u2. ACR1 also receives two 
redundant copies of aoa: aoa1 and aoa2.  The output function pr computes the pressure 
(p) inside the plane.  The input to this function is temperature (t) inside the cabin. 
There are two redundant copies of temperature t1 and t2 available at ACR1.  The 
output signal p is sent to the effector Effector1 and the output signal v is sent to the 
effector Effector2.    
o Lines 2-13 of Table 4.2 define the output function pr. Because there are two 
redundant copies of the input parameter t available at ACR1, there are also 
two <input> elements.     
o Lines 14-27 of Table 4.2 define the output function vel. Because there are 
two redundant copies of the input parameters u and aoa available at 
ACR1, there are also two <input> elements.     
 LRU1 and LRU2 are two sensors in this system that read the same data 
parameters: t, aoa, and u.  The readings of LRU1 are t1, aoa1, and u1.  
The readings of LRU2  are t2, aoa2, and u2.  These input readings are sent to 
ACR1 through two virtual links:  VL1 and VL2.  Both virtual links consist of two 
channels.  One of the channels of VL1 contains switches sw1, sw2, and a wire wr1, and 
the other channel of VL1 contains switches sw3, sw4, and a wire wr2.  One of the 
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channels of VL2 contains switches sw5, sw6, and a wire wr3, and the other channel of 
VL1 contains switches sw7, sw8, and a wire wr4.   
o Lines 28-39 of Table 4.2 specify the channels and source of the virtual link 
VL1.     
o Lines 54-64 of Table 4.2 specify the channels and source of the virtual link 
VL2.     
 VL1 carries signals from the sensor LRU1 to ACR1. The input reading t1 is 
packed in a dataset called ds1, and sent through a message called tMSG1.  Similarly, the 
input readings u1 and aoa1 are packed in a dataset called ds1, and sent through a 
message called u/aoaMSG1.  Virtual link VL2 carries signals from sensor LRU2 to 
ACR1. The input reading t2 is packed in a dataset called ds1, and sent through a 
message called tMSG2.  Similarly, the input readings u2 and aoa2 are packed in a 
dataset called ds1, and sent through a message called u/aoaMSG2.  
o Lines 40-52 of Table 4.2 define the messages tMSG1 and u/aoaMSG1 along 
with the input readings packed inside them.  
o Lines 65-77 of Table 4.2 define the messages tMSG2 and u/aoaMSG2 
along with the input readings packed inside them.  
 ACR1 computes the output signals p and v from the input readings it received 
from VL1 and VL2.  After computing the output signals, ACR1 sends both the output 
signals through the virtual link VL3. Virtual link VL3 consists of two channels.  One of 
the channels of VL3 contains switches sw9, sw10, and a wire wr5, and the other channel 
of VL3 contains switches sw11, sw12, and a wire wr6. Lines 79-89 of Table 4.2 specify 
the channels and source of the virtual link VL3.         
 VL3 carries the output signals p and v from the source ACR1.  These output 
signals are sent through the message p/vMSG1 to two effectors:  Effector1 and 
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Effector2.  The output signal p is packed in the dataset ds1 and sent to Effector1. 
Similarly, the output signal v is packed in the dataset ds2 and sent to Effector2.  Lines 
90-99 of Table 4.2 define the message p/vMSG1 along with the output signals packed 

























Table  4.2: CSML specification of the sample system. 
1 <csml> 
2      <of name="pr"> 
3          <host name="ACR1"> 
4              <output>p</output> 
5          </host> 
6          <input> 
7              <param>t1</param> 
8          </input> 
9          <input> 
10            <param>t2</param> 
11        </input> 
12        <dest name="Effector1"/> 
13    </of> 
14    <of name="vel"> 
15        <host name="ACR1"> 
16            <output>v</output> 
17        </host> 
18        <input> 
19            <param>aoa1</param> 
20            <param>u1</param> 
21       </input> 
22       <input> 
23            <param>aoa2</param> 
24            <param>u2</param> 
25      </input> 
26      <dest name="Effector2"/> 
27    </of> 
28    <vl name="VL1" source="LRU1"> 
29       <channel> 
30           <component>sw1</component> 
31           <component>wr1</component> 
32           <component>sw2</component> 
33       </channel> 
35       <channel> 
36            <component>sw3</component> 
37            <component>wr2</component>       
38            <component>sw4</component> 
39       </channel> 
40       <msg name="tMSG1"> 
41            <ds name="ds1"> 
42                <dest>ACR1</dest> 
43                <param>t1</param> 
44           </ds> 
45       </msg> 
46       <msg name="aoa/uMSG1"> 
47           <ds name="ds1"> 
48               <dest>ACR1</dest> 
49               <param>aoa1</param> 
50               <param>u1</param> 
51           </ds> 
52       </msg> 
53   </vl> 
54    <vl name="VL2" source="LRU2"> 
55       <channel> 
56           <component>sw1</component> 
57           <component>wr1</component> 
58           <component>sw2</component> 
59       </channel> 
60       <channel> 
61            <component>sw3</component> 
62            <component>wr2</component>       
63            <component>sw4</component> 
64       </channel> 
65       <msg name="tMSG2"> 
66            <ds name="ds1"> 
67                <dest>ACR1</dest> 
68                <param>t2</param> 
69           </ds> 
70       </msg> 
71       <msg name="aoa/uMSG2"> 
72           <ds name="ds1"> 
73               <dest>ACR1</dest> 
74               <param>aoa2</param> 
75               <param>u2</param> 
76           </ds> 
77       </msg> 
78   </vl> 
79    <vl name="VL3" source="ACR1"> 
80       <channel> 
81           <component>sw5</component> 
82           <component>wr3</component> 
83           <component>sw6</component> 
84       </channel> 
85       <channel> 
86            <component>sw7</component> 
87            <component>wr4</component>       
88            <component>sw8</component> 
89       </channel> 
90       <msg name="p/vMSG1"> 
91            <ds name="ds1"> 
92                <dest>Effector1</dest> 
93                <param>p</param> 
94           </ds> 
95            <ds name="ds2"> 
96                <dest>Effector2</dest> 
97                <param>v</param> 
98           </ds> 
99        </msg> 





GUI BASED DISPLAY 
 
 The GUI-based display of FauPA software lets the user perform a number of fault-
propagation tasks, including (1) determining whether faults in manually-selected 
components can propagate to the critical airplane components, (2) determining whether 
faults in automatically-selected components (currently single components, pairs of 
components  and triples of component are implemented) can propagate to the critical 
airplane components, and (3) viewing both textually and graphically the paths in the 
airplane through which faults can propagate to the critical airplane components.  
 Figure 5.1 shows the main screen of FauPA, which has three parts.   First, the 
view in the upper left part of the screen shows one type of hierarchical view of the system 
under analysis.  In this hierarchical view, physical components are shown as the terminal 
nodes, and a non-terminal node represents a subsystem. Second, the view in the bottom 
left part of the screen shows another type of hierarchical view of the system.  In this 
hierarchical view, each terminal node represents a dataset, which consists of multiple data 
signals (not shown).  A non-terminal node represents either a virtual link or a message.  
Nodes representing messages are shown as children of a node that represents the virtual 
link through which those messages are transmitted.  Nodes representing datasets are 
shown as children of a node that represents the message that contains those datasets.  





Figure 5.1:  Main view of FauPA. 
 
5.1 Performing Fault Propagation Tasks 
FauPA provides two ways to perform the fault-propagation tasks:  (1) manual and  
(2) batch.   In batch mode, a fault can be set automatically in every single component, 
pair of components, and triples of components at a time.  FauPA also lets all these   kinds 
of propagation tasks to be run simultaneously.  Thus, for example, a user can start a 
manual test while a batch test is running. 
 
5.1.1 Manual Propagation Task 
For the manual propagation task, a user introduces faults on some set of physical 
components in the system, initiates the propagation, and FauPA determines whether any 
of those faults propagates to the critical components.  FauPA displays the results after the 




5.1.2 B atch Propagation Task 
In the batch single-fault propagation task, FauPA automatically introduces faults 
in each component, one at a time, and determines whether the fault propagates to any 
critical component(s).  In batch pair-of-faults mode, FauPA automatically introduces 
faults in every pair of components and determines whether the faults reach any critical   
components.   Similarly, in batch triple-of-faults mode, FauPA automatically introduces 
faults in every triple of components and determines whether the faults reach any critical  
components. The list of all single, pair, and triple components from which faults can 
propagate to a critical node is displayed in the right side of the FauPA screen as shown in 
Figure 5.2.  
 
Figure 5.2:  Results of batch fault-propagation task. 
 
5.2 Visualizing the Fault Propagation Results 
If the fault(s) propagates to any critical component, the propagation information is 





5.2.1 Textual View of Analysis Results 
The textual view shows the information about the components through which the 
fault has propagated to reach the critical component(s).  Figure 5.3 shows a fault 
propagation result that is being displayed in textual view.  Figure 5.3 shows for a 
particular case, fault propagated through two LRUs, one ACR, eight switches, and three 
VLs before reaching a critical node. 
 
 
Figure 5.3:  Textual view of the analysis results. 
 
5.2.2 Graphical View of Analysis Results 
The graphical view shows the information about the components through which 
the fault has propagated as a graph that represents the model at two levels:  subsystem-
level view and detailed view.    
 
5.2.2.1 Subsystem-level graphical view of analysis results 
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Figure 5.4 shows the subsystem-level graphical view of the analysis results.  In 
this view, every node in the graph represents a subsystem.  Nodes that are involved in 
fault propagation are colored differently:  (1) nodes containing the components where 
fault is introduced and nodes containing the affected critical airplane component are 
shown in RED and (2) nodes involved in the propagation are shown in ORANGE.  
Figure 5.4 shows that a fault that is introduced in Flight Control System propagated 
through the components in Avionics & CCS & Cabin Systems, and finally reached a 
critical airplane-level component in Flight Deck Systems.  The nodes that contain the 
affected critical airplane components are shown in circle whereas other nodes are shown 
in rectangle shape. 
 
 
Figure 5.4:  Subsystem-level graphical view of analysis results. 
 
5.2.2.2 Detailed Graphical View of Analysis Results 
 Figure 5.5 shows the detailed graphical view of the analysis results.  This view 
displays all physical components, VLs and input signals as nodes. The coloring and 
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shapes of the nodes are similar to the subsystem-level graphical view described in section 
5.2.2.1.   Additionally, because this view represents all components of the system under 
consideration, those nodes that are not involved in the propagation are shown in GRAY.  
In Figure 5.5 one of the critical airplane components is shown in grey because fault did 
not propagate there. 
 
 
Figure 5.5:  Detailed graphical view of analysis results. 
  
The channels of a virtual link are not displayed by default in graphical views. 
However, clicking on a virtual link shows its channels as shown in Figure 5.6. The 
graphical views also support two other features that make it easier to navigate across 
views of large systems. The first feature is the mini-map feature. The mini-map, which is 
shown at the bottom right corner of a graphical view, shows a miniature view of the 
entire view. When a user clicks at a certain part of the system in the mini-map, the main 
view is centered on that part of the system. The second feature is the zoom-in and zoom-












            In safety-critical, networked embedded systems, it is important that the way in 
which a fault in one component can propagate through the system is analyzed correctly.  
Many real-world systems such as modern aircraft and automobiles use large-scale 
networked, embedded systems with complex behavior.  Because of the large size of such 
systems, it t is challenging to manually analyze the way in which a fault or faults   
propagates through such systems.  Furthermore, these systems usually have 
characteristics such as sharing of network or computational units among different sub-
systems that make it even more challenging to manually analyze those systems. 
            In this work, we have developed techniques and a software tool, FauPA, that uses 
those techniques to automate fault-propagation analysis of large-scale, networked 
embedded systems such as those used in modern aircrafts.  This work makes three   
contributions.  First, we developed algorithms for two types of analyses: a forward 
analysis and a backward analysis. For backward analysis, we developed two techniques: a 
naive algorithm and another algorithm that uses Datalog. Second, we developed a 
language that we call Communication System Markup Language (CSML) based on 
XML. A system can be specified concisely and at a high-level in CSML. Third, we 
developed a GUI to visualize the system that is specified in CSML. The GUI also lets the 
user visualize the results of fault-propagation analyses. 
            FauPA has two important advantages over the state-of-the-art fault-propagation 
approach that uses fault-trees. First, the input to FauPA is not a fault-tree, which can be 
difficult to construct manually for large systems. In particular, networked embedded 
systems that share network and computational units across sub-systems have a graph 
topology.  Thus, in a fault-tree based approach, the user must convert the graph topology 
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to fault-trees.  In contrast, the input to FauPA is a high-level specification of the system in 
CSML, and FauPA automatically constructs the fault-propagation graph (similar to fault-
trees) from that specification. Second, FauPA’s fault-propagation analyses can be more 
efficient than those used by fault-tree-based tools because the underlying fault-
propagation model used by FauPA’s analyses is a graph, which matches the natural 
representation (i.e., graph topology) of the system. 
            There are several ways in which this work can be extended.   First, current fault-
propagation analyses do not support timing-related constraints that exist in networked, 
embedded systems. One extension to this work is to address this shortcoming of current 
analyses.   Second, the current analyses support only OR and AND transfer functions. In 
the future, the analyses can be extended to support other types transfer functions that can 
aggregate fault statuses differently.  Third, building a CSML specification from scratch 
can be error-prone and difficult.  In future, a GUI-based tool can be developed that can 
assist a user to develop a CSML specification through a series of dialog boxes.  Finally, 
this work focuses on networked, embedded systems that are used in modern aircrafts and 
that use AFDX communication network.  In the future, FauPA can be extended to other 
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